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Chapter 3
The History and Philosophy of Science History
David Marshall Miller
Past science is studied from two perspectives. The intellectual history of science,
which focuses on the development of ideas and arguments, and the social history
of science, which focuses on the development of science as a social undertaking
within its broader contexts, are both alive in the academy. Nevertheless, these two
approaches do not interact very well, and the field of science history is bifurcated
along these lines. Indeed, intellectual and cultural historians of science tend, basi-
cally, to ignore one another. They have different training, different aims, different
audiences, and often different institutional homes. Intellectual historians of science
tend to be conversant with philosophers, social historians of science associate with
mainstream historians, but they do not often discourse with each other. In turn, this
has led to remarkable naïveté on each side regarding the work of science historians
across the disciplinary fence.
This disciplinary divide is signaled by the two dominant “brands” of science
history. On the one hand, scholars focusing on social history constitute the major-
ity of “History of Science” (HOS) graduate programs, which are often housed
within History departments, where socio-cultural approaches likewise predomi-
nate.1 One can include scholars of “STS” (“Science and Technology in Society”
or “Science and Technology Studies”) in this group, though STS comprises soci-
ological studies of science more broadly. On the other hand, scholars of “History
and Philosophy of Science” focus on intellectual history of science and are usually
aligned with Philosophy departments, at least in practice if not explicitly. There
are also many scholars in philosophy departments who examine the intellectual
history of philosophy, including natural philosophy. The study of science history
thus breaks down into an HOS approach on one side and an HPS approach on
the other.
1It is important to note that “History of Science” is not identical to the academic study of past
science. To avoid confusion, I use ‘science history’ for the latter.
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I should note that I am describing, in overly general terms, methodological
approaches to science history. Caveats abound. For one thing, the brands I describe
here often, but not always, line up with the institutional names of departments and
programs. HPS-style scholars can be found in “History of Science” departments,
and vice versa. For instance, the Science and Technology Studies department at
University College London maintains a heavy HPS cast, while the History and
Philosophy of Science department at Indiana includes both HOS- and HPS-type
scholars. Moreover, my overly general characterization does not capture all scholars
working on science history. There are “straight” intellectual historians, for example,
who are as skeptical of philosophy as they are of social history. I will try to locate
their work in the intellectual landscape below.
The division of science history into two dominant brands has never been com-
fortable, and what started off as problematic has only gotten worse. There have
been several attempts to redress the situation over the years, and a recent spate of
conferences has revisited the issue. These meetings have lamented the failure of
integration between intellectual and cultural history of science in particular and the
history and philosophy of science more generally, though I will argue below that
the conflation of these questions is part of the problem. Nevertheless, the confer-
ences and their participants have reflected the strict disciplinary divides they sought
to overcome.2 To speak only of meetings I have attended, the program at the March
2007 conference at Duke, titled “Do Historians and Philosophers of Science Have
Anything to Say to Each Other?” and the basis of the present volume, consisted pri-
marily of professional historians of science—HOSers. Meanwhile, the “Conference
in Integrated History and Philosophy of Science” at the University of Pittsburgh
in October 2007 featured mainly historically-inclined professional philosophers—
HPSers. In both cases, there was a remarkable amount of confusion and even disdain
regarding the aims and activities of the other camp, which was not sufficiently rep-
resented. These conferences illustrate in microcosm the general recognition that the
disciplinary boundaries between historically- and philosophically-inclined studies
of past science should be broken down. But they also show the level of miscompre-
hension about where those boundaries lie, and thus the total lack of consensus as to
how one should reconcile the two sides of the discipline. There is almost universal
agreement that there is a problem, and nearly universal disagreement about what the
problem is. HOS and HPS, it seems, have completely lost track of one another, to
the point of not knowing where each other are.
I share the opinion that the entrenched distinction between intellectual and social
history of science is deleterious to science history. A brief perusal of the history
2Symposia at meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association in 1970 and 1992 are representa-
tive. See Ruse (1992), Steinle and Burian (2002). More recent events also include “Do the history
of science and the philosophy of science have a future together?”, University College London, June
2006, and “Do the History of Science and the Philosophy of Science Have Anything to Say to Each
Other?”, Florida State, March 2008 (which shared no speakers with the similarly titled Duke con-
ference). There have also been two subsequent conferences on “Integrated History and Philosophy
of Science” (colloquially known as &HPS) in 2009 (at Notre Dame) and 2010 (at Indiana). Another
is scheduled for 2012 in Athens.
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and philosophy of the discipline reveals that the distinction is not native to science
history. It was imposed from without as science historians sought institutional and
intellectual refuge in Philosophy and in mainstream History. These allied disciplines
then co-opted science history to their own ends, rending the field. The distinc-
tion, moreover, is pernicious since it does not derive from past science. By leading
scholars to focus on one aspect of the object of study, the distinction artificially
closes off legitimate routes of inquiry. Disciplinary prejudices blind the scholar
to important interactions between the intellectual and the social that are clearly
and unproblematically present in actual past science. Nevertheless, the distinc-
tion persists. It is continually reinforced by the training and practice of science
historians.
The situation calls for critical self-reflection. Science historians need to iden-
tify the disciplinary boundaries that separate them as a first step toward overcoming
them. It will be helpful, in particular, to situate the historical study of science in
its historical and philosophical context. By recognizing the intellectual and social
bases of their practices, scholars will be able to recognize where they stand in
the disciplinary landscape and where others stand in relation to them—how they
are separated and how they are continuous. This mapping of the field as a whole
should at least engender a discussion that spans the discipline and will perhaps lead
to the kind of interaction and cooperation that has been lacking heretofore. Both
HOS and HPS approaches are necessary for a proper understanding of past sci-
ence, and better dialogue between them would make scholarship more effective and
more productive. Science historians will need to renegotiate the boundaries of their
own discipline in order to integrate the segregated approaches and counteract the
divisive, extrinsic demands of Philosophy and History. The divisions between HOS
and HPS may be ultimately irreconcilable, but we should at least understand why
this is so.
In the interest of the self-criticism I advocate, I admit that I am trained as an intel-
lectual historian of science in the HPS mode, and I bear the prejudices and biases
pertaining thereto. What follows will surely be a product of those presuppositions
and may therefore strike my audience as odd or ill-founded, especially since I am
likely representative of a minority view.3 If so, I welcome criticism, since it will
illuminate and evince defenses of the otherwise tacit prejudices of both sides. The
resulting discussion would be precisely the kind of reflective criticism and rene-
gotiation that I aim to promote. From my limited, individual perspective, I cannot
foresee the ultimate consensus, if any, that may be reached by the discipline as a
whole, and I am not advocating one brand of science history over another. If I am
against anything, it is the unreflective adherence to the norms of the HPS and HOS
brands that I think is all too common.
3HOS is by far the more common approach. To give one crude measure, of the fifty-nine American
graduate programs listed on the History of Science Society’s website, only two are separate HPS
departments (Indiana and Pittsburgh) and only three more are listed as HPS “programs” (Notre
Dame, Texas-Austin, and Montana State). Indiana, Pitt, and Notre Dame are excellent, well-
respected programs, but Rachel Laudan’s assertion that HPS-style historians of science are an
“endangered species” still rings true (Laudan 1992).
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3.1 A History of Science History
Scholarly disciplines are bounded by disciplinary prejudices. One must accept the
presuppositions of a field in order to be counted as a member of it. Graduate
training is intended to inculcate such assumptions, and the sublimation of founda-
tional questions is the mark of a mature scholar. Of course, disciplinary prejudices
are necessary, since the phenomena under scrutiny are simply too hoary to make
sense of without them. The rules and methods of the discipline allow the scholar
to filter out the subject of their interest from everything else. Disciplines dif-
fer because they focus on different aspects of phenomena—they use different
biases. By the same token, though, scholars do not often scrutinize the founda-
tional assumptions of their work. This makes it difficult to adjust methods and
aims once a discipline has matured and foundational questions have been settled.
Scholarly interest is understandably directed outward, not back on the scholar’s own
practice.
In most cases, disciplinary biases are not problematic, since disciplines tend to
either spontaneously grow up around their subjects, cleave themselves off of parent
disciplines, or combine the methods of existing disciplines. These developments are
organic, occurring in the course of the dialectic between scholars and the phenom-
ena they study. The disciplinary prejudices that emerge are natural, in the sense that
they are motivated by and appropriate to the objects of study,4 generating coher-
ent and productive scholarly programs. However, when the disciplinary prejudices
are awkward and uncomfortable, as in science history, one must question them to
diagnose and resolve the problem. For instance, we can examine the history of the
history of science in order to figure out how science history came to be divided into
two distinct parts.
The history of science history has been told before,5 but it bears repeating, at
least in very broad outline, since it begins the process of self-reflection that is ulti-
mately necessary to reconcile and reconstitute the field. Making their traditions
explicit helps scholars of both HOS and HPS to recognize their activity in rela-
tion to that of the other brand. In particular, the history of the discipline and its
separate brands partly explains the accidental and artificial nature of the prejudices
afflicting its current practice. One finds that what began as an organic discipline
came to be co-opted by Philosophy and mainstream History, and therefore became
beholden to their extrinsic concerns. The disciplinary prejudices dividing HOS from
HPS are, in this sense, artificial, since they did not arise from the history of science
itself. The discomfort felt by scholars in the field is, in part, a recognition of this
artificiality.
In the Enlightenment, natural science was held as the epitome of human
accomplishment. Newton’s achievements demonstrated the highest measure of illu-
mination, and all the other disciplines sought to emulate the example. Thus, science
4For a more substantial biological metaphor for science historiography, see Machamer (1994).
5For example, Christie (1990), Cohen (1994), Kragh (1987), Nickles (1995).
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history of a sort was practiced within various fields by those aiming to establish their
disciplines as “sciences” in the style of mechanics. The histories produced were
whiggish, since the point was to emphasize the inexorable progress made toward
certainty, not the actual development of a discipline, with all its sidetracks and red
herrings. Hence the “historical” chapters of science textbooks and the biographies
of “great men” typical of eighteenth and nineteenth century science history. Joseph
Priestley’s histories of electricity and optics and Charles Darwin’s historical intro-
duction to the Origin of Species are tokens of this type.6 Hence also the work of
William Whewell, whose study of the “inductive sciences” was meant to show their
progressive consolidation of knowledge.
In its original form, science history was also naturally associated with
Philosophy, since the main interest was epistemological: the eventual establish-
ment of sure knowledge. Whewell, for instance, thought of himself as primarily
a philosopher, and his History of the Inductive Sciences was part of the philosoph-
ical project expressed by his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. The naturalness
of this association can also be seen in the strong effects philosophy, especially pos-
itivism, had on the natural sciences themselves around the turn of the twentieth
century in the work of scientist-philosophers like Mach, Poincaré, Einstein, and
Reichenbach.7 Out of this whiggish, positivist, intrascientific tradition emerged the
first professional historians of science, most notably George Sarton and Alexandre
Koyré. Sarton, originally trained as a mathematician, lionized Poincaré, whose por-
trait he put on the frontispiece of the first issue of Isis in 1913. Koyré’s graduate
work was in philosophy and mathematics, some of which he pursued at Göttingen
under Husserl and Hilbert.
Meanwhile, mainstream History had been divided by the effects of nineteenth-
century work by Hegel and Marx. Like their Enlightenment predecessors, Hegel
and Marx believed in the progress of human history, but they evaluated progress
differently. Hegel held it was an essentially intellectual phenomenon; Marx thought
it was essentially material. So, for Hegel, the benefit of science was its ability to
produce knowledge. For Marx, it was the ability to produce things.8 The earliest
incarnation of science history was naturally linked to the Hegelian approach, since
it located progress in the approach toward certainty—i.e., in the intellectual realm.
As we shall see, though, it is this initial difference of perspective, endemic to main-
stream History, not science history, that laid the groundwork for the divisions that
afflict science history today.
In the early twentieth century, the Hegelian and Marxist accounts of human
progress became associated with broad political movements. Hegelianism was per-
verted into nationalism, which stressed allegiance to and the progress of a national
idea, and from there into fascism. Marxism was folded into socialism and thence
communism. The resulting ideological tensions soon came to be reflected in the way
6Christie (1990), Kragh (1987).
7Feigl (1970) also makes this argument.
8Christie (1990, 12).
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science history was studied.9 The Second International Congress for the History
of Science, held in London in 1931, was a pivotal moment. The conference con-
sisted mainly of intellectual historians with nationalist tendencies, but the seven
delegates from the Soviet Union made a deep impression arguing the Marxist point
of view. For them, science was a socially conditioned human practice, responsive
to “external,” non-intellectual factors. Famously, Boris Hessen gave a talk reduc-
ing Newton’s science to the material and economic problems of his time, class, and
so on. Though this was serious and striking historiography, it was also Soviet pro-
paganda, and Moscow’s embassy in London furiously translated and published the
delegation’s papers as Science at the Cross Roads within ten days.10 Sympathetic
scholars, like J. D. Bernal, Joseph Needham, and Edgar Zilsel, were converted to
the Soviets’ approach, and the event marked the beginning of the widely recognized
“externalist” study of science history. The traditional Hegelian “internalism” contin-
ued to prevail, however, and externalism remained relatively marginal. Nevertheless,
the Hegelian-Marxist split had injected itself into science history, partly as a result
of global politics.
In mainstream History, Marxism eventually penetrated much deeper, almost to
the complete exclusion of intellectual approaches, which were driven off into other
fields, such as political science. This was especially true after the rise and ulti-
mate self-immolation of fascism up through World War II and the holocaust, which
tainted Hegelian-style intellectual history with vapors of totalitarianism and moral
turpitude. Even today, intellectual historians in general struggle to find a place
in History departments, where they are seen as conservative, old-fashioned, and
vaguely sinister. Science history, however, was a special case. The field proved resis-
tant to the general historiographical trend, precisely because science itself, insofar
as it makes claims to rationality and truth, resists complete reduction to material or
social considerations such as economy, race, class, and gender.11
Such resistance was a mixed blessing. On the one hand, science history was left
outside the practical and institutional pale of mainstream historical studies and thus
relegated to minority, outsider status. On the other hand, intellectual historians of
science found a welcoming reception by the Western conservative establishment
after the war, which sought to use science history to explicitly counter the Marxism
infiltrating the humanities. Science history was also seen as a way of encourag-
ing student interest in science, and thus formed an essential part of a Cold War
curriculum designed to promote the American scientific excellence that would over-
come the Soviets. The notion of a Scientific Revolution, coined and popularized by
Koyré, was also useful in demonstrating a kind of revolution that did not involve
violence or, for that matter, the overthrow of a capitalist system. Moreover, science
9As one might expect from their intellectual predilections, Sarton and Koyré had right-wing polit-
ical inclinations. They were nationalists and anti-Marxist. Koyré, a white Russian who emigrated
during the revolution, was particularly fervent in this respect.
10Cohen (1994), Young (1990, 80–84).
11Laudan (1990, esp. 51).
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history fit with the broader cultural excitement about the power and profits of science
and technology.12 Altogether, then, these intellectual and cultural factors led to the
first substantial institutionalization of science history. History of science programs
(sometimes entitled “History and Philosophy of Science,” reflecting the involve-
ment of philosophers, though not yet representative of the HPS mode) were set up,
usually by science faculties, at Harvard, Princeton, Columbia, Oxford, Cambridge,
Leeds, Sydney, Melbourne, and elsewhere.13 Thus, science history found an institu-
tional home, but it was a home apart from and in opposition to mainstream History.
This Hegelian, intellectual tradition of science history remained dominant through-
out the 1950s and early 1960s. The “internalist” stalwarts successfully defended
the discipline from a few “externalist” critiques, which were dismissed as “a bit
Marxist.”14
Everything changed with the publication of Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of
Scientific Revolutions in 1962. Kuhn himself was a typical, scientifically-trained,
philosophically-inclined, intellectual historian of science. In Structure, Kuhn tried
to give an intellectual account of scientific change, but his argument located sci-
entific knowledge in the “paradigm”—a communal entity consisting of shared
concepts, practices, problems, and specialized languages. In a move Kuhn neither
foresaw nor approved of, Structure seemed to warrant a reduction of science to a
socio-culturally constituted paradigm.15 Kuhn’s theory also raised the specter of
radical incommensurability, which threatened the very notion of scientific objec-
tivity, especially in the hands of Kuhn’s Berkeley colleague, the philosopher Paul
Feyerabend. Hence, Structure weakened science history’s traditional defense against
socio-cultural materialist reductions, the appeal to the fundamental rationality and
objectivity of science itself. Soon enough, Marxist-style historians had taken over
and assimilated science history into History departments proper. In some ways, this
was quite welcome, since science history could now call on the resources of main-
stream History. “Conservative” intellectual historians, however, were once again
driven out of the “History of Science” as practiced in the universities.
Besides its Kuhnian justification, the turn toward a more sociological approach
to science history found political motiovation in the New Left.16 Older Marxists
12Mayer (1999).
13There were precursors. At University College London, a Department of History and Method
of Science was founded in 1921–1922 and renamed History and Philosophy of Science in 1938.
George Sarton had helped establish the Harvard Committee on Higher Degrees in the History of
Science and Learning in the 1920s, and Harvard began granting PhDs in History of Science in
1936 (Bennett 1997; Cohen 1984; Hall 1984; Kuhn 1984; Smeaton 1997).
14Henry Guerlac reported this as a colleague’s response to his own work (Guerlac 1977, 36). Cohen
speculates that the colleague was Koyré (Cohen 1994, 561n168). More damaging to “internalism”
were critiques from other intellectual historians, like Frances Yates, who challenged the presump-
tion of a well-defined rational “science” apart from other cognitive, but “irrational,” activities, such
as magic (Hesse 1970; Turner 1990).
15Whether Kuhn’s work actually warrants this move is still a point of vigorous debate.
16Porter (1990, 41).
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had thought—in the Enlightenment style—that science was on their side. Science
would provide the material culture needed for the post-revolutionary utopia. By the
1950s and 1960s, though, science had become part of the conservative, capitalistic
establishment. In the view of the New Left, science was used to impose social norms
and was therefore anti-democratic. Of course, this view was not entirely mistaken.
The early to mid-twentieth century enthusiasm for race hygiene and eugenics is only
one case in point. The social historians also had more recent examples of science’s
sometimes objectionable role in the military-industrial complex, such as nuclear
weapons, MIT’s Draper Laboratory, the Tuskegee Experiments, DDT, and so on. In
order to undermine the establishment, they had to disparage science and reduce its
social role. This made social historians, to some degree, anti-science. They sought
to emphasize the social mechanisms by which scientists come to accept beliefs, and
they downplayed the significance of the “objective” features of science, including
its intellectual content and its predictive and explanatory power. Here, the social
historians found allied interests amongst sociologists of science, descended from
the work of Robert K. Merton. Merton’s study of scientific values and institutions
fit well with the study of paradigms, since the former help determine the latter.17
The conquest was as complete as it was sudden. In the 1950s, the internalists
held the upper hand. By 1968, the so-called “internalism-externalism debate” had
been declared over. The end of the debate did not represent a compromise so much
as a sound defeat of the internalists, who ceded the field and the brand name to
the externalist approach. Programs in “History of Science” were converted to the
externalist approach, or even into STS programs outright. That the “internalism-
externalism debate” is now outdated (and that it is gauche to revisit the issue) is
evidence of total victory—there are simply too few internalists left in “History
of Science” to make a stand. In fact, the very meaning of “internalism” itself has
changed. In current usage, it often signifies the socio-cultural interactions within sci-
ence, as opposed to science’s interactions with the wider socio-cultural sphere. But
even this would have been considered “external” on the earlier meaning of ‘inter-
nalism,’ which referred to a historiographical approach focused on the internal logic
of scientific progress.18 Internalism in this older sense has been practically effaced
from “History of Science” as it is presently conducted. We should not confuse the
practical victory of the Marxist-style externalists for rational propriety, though. The
state of play does not mean the distinction is or ever was dissolved. The internalists
have simply moved on.
Though no longer considered part of “History of Science” proper, intellectual
science history found a ready reception amongst philosophers. Since the 1920s, the
17The alliance was somewhat ironic, though, since Merton himself was fiercely anti-Marxist and
intended his work to show, like his predecessor Weber’s, the essential importance of Western, cap-
italistic, and individualistic values for the development of science. Merton claimed that “external”
factors could affect the rate and not the course of scientific development, which was determined
only by its internal logic, but later Marxist-style historians claimed him for their purposes (Shapin
1992, 336–37; Young 1990, 83).
18Compare, for example, Cohen (1994) or Hesse (1970) to Shapin (1992).
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logical positivists and, later, the analytic philosophers descended from them, had
strived to protect their discipline from the same sort of political impositions that
had injected themselves into History. The early logical positivists of the Vienna
Circle of the 1930s, for instance, were especially concerned to show that Philosophy
could achieve transcendent validity and value. Recalling Enlightenment attitudes
and inspired by recent mathematical and scientific achievements (e.g., Einstein’s
relativity theory and the formalization of mathematics by Russell and Whitehead),
these philosophers held science to be a model of the transcendent objectivity they
sought for themselves. They tried to turn philosophy into science, eschewing non-
empirical “metaphysics,” on the one hand and seeking out the methods that make a
discipline scientific, on the other.
At first, this program was pursued “logically”—through a priori reasoning. By
the middle of the century, though, it was accepted that the so-called linguistic
turn had failed. Famously, philosophers could not even establish criteria by which
“science” could be distinguished from metaphysics or pseudoscience. Kuhn and
Feyerabend, along with Imre Lakatos, Norwood Russell Hanson, and Stephen
Toulmin, were part of a generation of philosophers who sought to base their analy-
ses of science on its actual past and present practice. In their work, Hegelian-style
intellectual history of science offered both raw data and proving ground for philo-
sophical models of rationality. Their calls for empirical studies of science led to a
cooperation with the holdouts of the “right wing” of science history, which led to the
establishment or reinvention of a handful of HPS departments and programs across
the globe around 1970, thereby initiating the modern HPS brand. It must be noted,
however, that these historically-interested philosophers primarily sought to use his-
tory for philosophical insights, but denied that history per se contained anything of
philosophical significance. Even Lakatos, one of the most vocal supporters of the
cooperation of Philosophy and science history, advocated “rational reconstructions”
of science—science as it “should have happened”—and relegated the reporting of
historical facts to footnotes.19
After Kuhn, science history has developed along the two distinct paths that sep-
arate the discipline today. In HOS/STS, the first sustained movement was Social
Constructivism (or “Social Structure of Knowledge”), which first flourished in the
1970s with work by David Bloor and Barry Barnes. The social constructivists took
the reduction of science to social mechanisms to a radical extreme (following a
similar development in mainstream History), arguing that scientific knowledge is
entirely constituted by social interactions.20 Social constructivism itself has lost
much of its impetus, but similar trends remain powerful amongst science histori-
ans of the HOS variety. Foucault, whose views are widely influential, emphasized
the relations between power and “knowledge”—including scientific knowledge.
Another dominant tendency, partially inspired by a move towards narrative in
19Hanson (1962), Lakatos (1971). See also Kuhn (1977).
20In fact, Barry Barnes has argued that the historian is best served if she is completely ignorant of
the beliefs held by the scientists she studies (Barnes 1990, 71).
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mainstream History and exemplified by Shapin and Schaffer, is to study scientific
practice in very particular geo-temporal contexts, to the exclusion of transcendent
considerations.
The point of this brief history is that science history resisted the general trend
of History during the twentieth century, since it was traditionally and constitu-
tionally aligned with the Hegelian-style intellectual history falling out of favor
in light of world events. The work of Kuhn and its surrounding counter-culture
atmosphere then undermined the very features of science that science historians
had used to organically develop and defend their own scholarship. Never very
large and still relatively young, the field was cut intellectually and institution-
ally adrift, open to the imprecations of more established disciplines, particularly
History and Philosophy, that co-opted science history to their own purposes. This
has led to a bifurcated field, resting uncomfortably between History and Philosophy,
where different practitioners identify more with their institutional peers than with
each other.
3.2 Philosophy of Science History
The situation would be unproblematic if science history’s cognate disciplines could
cooperate. Science history would then be a natural overlap, in the way that, say,
biochemistry bridges biology and chemistry. Painting with a broad brush, the trouble
is that mainstream History and Philosophy are inherently at odds with one another.
While both disciplines have legitimate affinities and interests in science history, they
end up exerting centrifugal forces that artificially pull the discipline further apart.
Especially in the English-speaking world, Philosophy sees itself as a normative
discipline in that it, broadly speaking, studies epistemic norms and examines argu-
ments in order to figure out how beliefs should lead to each other. The aim is to
understand the nature of human reasoning (of all kinds).21 Science has a remark-
able power to produce convincing claims about the world. Philosophers are intrigued
by this argumentative power, and they seek to isolate the forms of argument—the
rational method—by which science achieves its epistemic efficacy. Science history,
therefore, provides a store of arguments with which philosophers can construct and
evaluate their models of rational behavior. They look to science history as a way to
determine which epistemologies “work” and which do not.
History, on the other hand, sees itself as a descriptive discipline. The aim is to
get as close as possible to past events and figure out the conditions and motors of
human activity. Science is interesting because of its importance amongst human
practices, especially in the Western Tradition, where scientific activities, products,
21A simple description of Philosophy is difficult, and exceptions to my two-sentence definition are
common. Still, I think this view of the general slant of the field holds. For instance, this character-
ization captures the many philosophers who see themselves as merely describing (as opposed to
prescribing) norms, as in naturalized epistemology.
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and values are central. Science has a remarkable power to affect the conditions of
human existence, and historians seek the sources and effects of this power.
These disciplinary self-conceptions rest, in turn, on antithetical presuppositions.
Philosophers (for the most part) presume that there is an absolute measure of ratio-
nal conviction against which different epistemological methods can be measured,
regardless of socio-cultural context. A good argument, most philosophers would
contend, justifies its conclusion independently of the particular material and social
conditions under which it is formulated. In philosophy, therefore, past arguments,
including scientific ones, are shorn of any non-cognitive or even non-rational con-
text. It makes perfect philosophical sense, for instance, to compare the views of two
authors widely separated in time or to ask for an earlier author’s possible response
to a later author (e.g., how would Descartes respond to Newton?).22
Historians dismiss all of this as a “positivist” delusion. The assumption of a tran-
scendental measure of argumentative “success” is unfounded. The failure of the
demarcation project itself shows that one cannot decide a priori what counts as
“rational” or “scientific.” Arguments are always conditioned by their social and
material context. Their power to engender belief depends, in part, on who makes
them and to whom they are made.23 Even the basic determinations “science” and
“rational” must be contextualized in a particular time and place; the more detailed
the contextualization, the better. In particular, there is no reason whatsoever to
exclude non-cognitive factors as irrelevant. (Indeed, given the old Marxist prejudice
against intellectualism, historians are likely to emphasize non-cognitive factors over
cognitive ones.) The philosophers’ preoccupation with the intellectual realm threat-
ens to anachronistically distort the historical account. The philosophers’ pursuit
of rationality, says the historian, fails to say anything definitive about the essen-
tially contextualized human condition. Hence, the philosophical study of science is
ill-founded and uninteresting.24
To philosophers, meanwhile, historians commit a logical fallacy of their own
by presuming the failure to describe transcendental rational norms entails that such
norms do not exist. Historians, therefore, adopt a philosophical position for which no
sustained argument is offered. It is impossible to study anything, history included,
without some a priori framework by which phenomena are made meaningful. All
22A partial exception can be made for feminist philosophy and related studies of “science and
values.” These areas do acknowledge the effects of social values on reasoning and science, though
the morals drawn are often still normative: how reasoning and science should respond to external
values.
23See Laudan (1990), Shea (1983), Thackray (1970a).
24To be fair, philosophers of science themselves have recognized the failure of the universalizing
project. As a result, they have turned to more specific studies of particular disciplines (viz. the
philosophy of physics, the philosophy of biology, and so on). While this sort of philosophy of
science remains preoccupied with the normative and transcendent features of science, it is more
sensitive to specifics of practice and argument. On the other hand, historians are generally unaware
of these philosophical developments, so their conception of “philosophy of science” is often an
outdated caricature—which is all the more reason to encourage dialogue.
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observations are theory-laden, and it is the historians who are overly “positivist”25
in their insistence that anachronism can and must be avoided.26 Philosophers also
see no profit in complete contextualization and they are not interested in antiquar-
ian description for description’s sake. They want the payoff for their own, always
present-day, essentially rational selves. Hence, the historical study of science is
ill-founded and uninteresting.
Of course, both sides are, basically, right.27 Within their respective disciplines,
though, historians and philosophers are entitled (and expected) to ignore such crit-
icisms and hold up their basic presuppositions as regulative ideals around which to
organize their inquiry. After all, these prejudices grew up organically within those
disciplines, and they effectively shape scholarly discourse into something manage-
able. History is meant to study the conditions of human experience, Philosophy
is meant to study human reason, and both perform their functions well. However,
the science historians now operating in the midst of these disciplines are forced
to make an impossible choice. To be an accepted scholar within one discipline or
the other, they must either place an inordinate focus on the cognitive and universal
aspects of science and minimize the contingent and contextual, or they must con-
textualize away the very universal claims that give science its special socio-cultural
status and mark it out as a distinct human activity. In other words, science historians
face the “barren antithesis”28 of studying science without history or history without
science. Both approaches are risible. They completely vitiate the intensions of the
scholarship. HPSers are left with a gross misunderstanding of scientific reasoning,
and HOSers fail to recognize the primary motor of scientific activity. Still, far too
many authors capitulate. One is frequently frustrated by attempts to make sense of
a scientific episode without any reference to its historical context or to describe a
historical context without making any sense of the science it surrounds. As Larry
Laudan has put the point: “Many have evidently concluded that the only alternative
to the disembodied history of scientific ideas is a lobotomized history of scientific
institutions.”29
The other distinctive features of HOS- and HPS-style scholarship derive from
the prejudices and practices of History and Philosophy. In very broad generalization,
science historians of the HOS stripe today tend to be trained as historians, not as sci-
entists, which is to say they tend to be socio-cultural historians like their mainstream
History peers.30 They lean toward a deflationary view of science as just another
human activity without any universal pretensions. The heartland of HOS/STS is
25The overlapping but different connotations of this pejorative further signify the incommensura-
bility between the philosophical and historical worldviews.
26Baltas (1994), Burian (2003), Nickles (1995, esp. 151–55).
27See, for further discussion Burian (1977), McMullin (1970).
28Thackray (1970b).
29Laudan (1990).
30HOSers, in my experience, sometimes excuse their focus on socio-cultural factors by pleading
ignorance about the actual workings of science, which forms a sort of “black box” at the center of
the institutions and activities they study. However, this does not excuse the general lack of interest
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post-war twentieth-century science, where funding structures, collaborations, and
technological outputs exemplify the socio-cultural entanglements of the scientific
enterprise.31 Socio-cultural historians also favor “thick” explanations that include
all relevant causes, including the “little losers” of science—those whose contribu-
tion was minor or even completely forgotten. Hence, HOSers, like their mainstream
historian peers, favor books as the measure of scholarly contributions. These tend
to be written for a non-scientific audience, and HOSers often find themselves pitted
against scientists in the culture wars, since scientists see the relativism embodied in
their contextual approach as a threat.32
On the other side, HPS has been largely co-opted by the disciplinary concerns of
Philosophy more generally. Hence, intellectual historians of science today tend to
be trained as philosophers, and to share the anti-historical prejudices of that dis-
cipline. They seek to construct transcendent models of scientific reasoning and
anachronistically ignore the contingent, “irrational” factors in the development of
science. HPSers focus on periods in which intellectual progress is most on display
and the intellectual contributions of individuals is clearest. Thus, they concentrate
on the scientific revolution and turn-of-the-twentieth-century physics. For the same
reason, they also tend to focus on the “big winners” of science whose work was
the most influential or “successful.” Also, HPSers often write only for the benefit
of their philosophical peers or interested scientists, without trying to reach a gen-
eral audience. They focus on particular epistemological issues and write papers.
And so on.33
To me, all these divergent tendencies in a discipline that is ostensibly about one
thing—past science—are evidence that the disciplinary biases by which History
and Philosophy distinguish themselves do not answer to any clear distinctions
in past science itself.34 The thing we call “science” lies at the intersection of
ideas and society. It is a complex set of human practices that occur in a social,
in trying to understand, even to a small degree, scientific reasoning. Such interest, by contrast, is
expected amongst intellectual historians and philosophers of science.
31I should note that HOS-type historians, following Shapin and Schaffer, have recently applied
socio-cultural historiography to the scientific revolution. Westman and Biagioli, for instance, apply
institutional analysis to the work of Galileo. The burgeoning interest in the history of renaissance
and early-modern alchemy, astrology, and magic represents a similar trend. Though these were
originally treated quite intellectually in the hands of Yates, Dobbs, Newman, Principe, and oth-
ers, the pseudo-scientific status of these activities has allowed more recent authors to downplay
the intellectual content of historical episodes. Also, the field of readership studies in mainstream
History has allowed HOSers to focus on the conveyance of ideas, rather than ideas themselves.
These trends might be considered an offensive maneuver, since they threaten to expel intellectual
science historians from areas where they have hitherto enjoyed preeminence. On the other hand,
these trends might be an opportunity for increased dialogue and cooperation. I fear the former and
hope for the latter.
32Turner (1990).
33In a keynote paper at the &HPS1 conference, Peter Machamer listed over twenty such
distinctions separating philosophy and history of science. See also Richards (1992).
34I do not mean to prejudge the issue as to whether there is any well-defined thing called “sci-
ence.” For the time being, let the term signify an actors’ category—“science” is whatever is called
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cultural, and material context. It has its institutions, its resources, its products, its
traditions, it communities, its power relations, its values, and so on. But almost
uniquely amongst human activities, science is also an argumentative discipline that
makes claims to transcendent, objective truth. The scientific enterprise is a won-
derfully efficient producer of accepted truths about the world. Science, in itself,
has always chugged along quite happily both as intellectual endeavor with preten-
sions to universality and as socially conditioned cooperative enterprise. Scientists
respond to a wide range of influences, some obviously cognitive, some obviously
socio-cultural or material, and many in between. Moreover, they are unconcerned
with Cartesian distinctions between their mental and physico-socio-cultural states
or Reichenbachian distinctions between the “context of discovery” and the “con-
text of justification.” It might be impossible for them or anyone else to say how
cognitive and social factors interact (they may even deny such interaction), but
it is clear that they do, just as it is clear that scientists operate without separat-
ing epistemic contexts. It is therefore possible and, indeed, necessary to study all
these aspects of scientific activity in conjunction, without privileging one or the
other, according to the peculiar demands of the scientific enterprise itself. Importing
the prejudices of History and Philosophy into science history has caused science
historians to ignore fruitful paths of inquiry and artificially constrained their nar-
ratives. Science history is pulled to the extremes when it should naturally seek the
middle.
For all of the forgoing reasons, I am deeply pessimistic about attempts to “marry”
or “integrate” the history and philosophy of science.35 I am also, with Steven
Shapin, suspicious of eclectic historiography of science that aims to be part inter-
nalist and part externalist.36 The broader disciplines are simply too much at odds
with one another. Though they may occasionally have something to say to one
another, they will mainly turn their backs on one another. For the most part, they
already have.37 I am more optimistic about the possibility of a unified science his-
tory, though the two brands cannot be reconciled as long as they remain beholden
to the conflicting prejudices and practices of the cognate disciplines in which they
are ensconced. Philosophy is too anti-historical and History is too anti-intellectual
for HOS and HPS as presently constituted to meet on common ground. Science
history must reconcile its distinctions on its own terms, as an integrated unity with
‘science’. I suspect that there is more to it than that, but this is one of the many questions I seek to
open for discussion.
35See Feyerabend (1970), Kuhn (1977), McMullin (1970). I am more optimistic about the program
recently expounded by Mary Domski and Michael Dickson (following Michael Friedman), which
calls for a “reinvigoration” of a pre-Kuhnian (actually, Cassirer-ian) “synthetic approach” (Domski
and Dickson 2010).
36Shapin (1992). See Nickles (1995), Steinle and Burian (2002) for such suggestions.
37Historians almost never reach out to philosophers. Philosophers are a little more circumspect,
but proposals for dialogue with History usually amount to calls for the culling of History for philo-
sophical ends, not a sincere interest in doing responsible history. See, e.g., Burian (1977), Hull
(1992).
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its own disciplinary bounds. Science historians should loosen the bonds of History
and Philosophy and make their discipline anew, in dialogue with past science
itself.38
3.3 Mapping the Field
One way to begin the unification of science history is to attempt to map the field
as it now stands. This will allow us to formalize many of the distinctions between
different kinds of science history, as well as encourage reflection, discussion, and
discourse by allowing scholars to locate and defend their positions in relation to one
another. If we seek to set up a big tent, a map will help us figure out where to pitch
it, or at least have a coherent argument about where to pitch it.
As a start, I propose a representation of the historiography of science along two
axes suggested by the historical and philosophical discussion above. There are many
other ways of representing the field, but I think these axes offer a tidy way of con-
straining the discussion, since they seem to be both orthogonal and comprehensive.
That is, a scholar’s position along one axis does not determine his position along
the other, and every historiographical approach in the field can be uniquely located
somewhere in the space defined by the axes. I put forward these axes tentatively,
however. They are meant merely as a starting point for discussion, not the last word.
I welcome disagreement, since it forces us all to reflect on the nature of our own
scholarly project, and it is precisely this reflexivity that will lead to compromise.
Also, by plotting the field of science history on these axes, it becomes clear that
intellectual and socio-cultural histories are continuous with one another. The dis-
ciplinary prejudices that separate them are more or less arbitrary boundaries on
a homogeneous landscape. There may be reasons to accept them, but such rea-
sons need to be clearly articulated and defended, since they do not follow apparent
“natural” distinctions.
The first axis has to do with the causal role of intellectual and non-intellectual
factors in the production of scientific knowledge. One can think of this axis as
expressing a pseudo-numerical ratio between socio-cultural, external factors and
intellectual, internal factors. The extreme internalist (at “0”) denies any causal
efficacy to socio-cultural context in the development of science. On this view, sci-
ence develops entirely according to its own internal logic, via purely intellectual
exchanges amongst its practitioners, as if they were all part of a single mental pro-
cess. Moving away from this extreme, one allows more and more significance to
socio-cultural, material, and institutional conditions, until one reaches (at “infinity”)
the extreme externalist, who believes that scientific reason is purely epiphenomenal,
floating on top of the non-intellectual context surrounding scientific activity that is
solely responsible for any change.
38On the other hand, I would reject calls to let the two brands go their separate ways. See Pinnick
and Gale (2000), Strasser (2005).
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The second axis concerns the temporal telos or aim of scholarship. At one
extreme is the view that history is meant to reconstruct the past “as it really was.”
Extreme temporalists thus seek to immerse themselves in the past, with all of
its twisting complexity, frighted by the specter of anachronism at every turn and
hermeneutically circling ever closer to historical fact. At the other end of the scale
are the extreme presentists, who study history in order to instruct the present or
even the transcendent. These authors write from an anachronistic point of view and
comfortably relate past events to their own concerns and interests, to the point of
“rationally reconstructing” the past in their own image.
It seems that most, if not all, distinctive features of various historiographies can
be read off from their position on this map. That is, one’s position on the map deter-
mines the kind of scholarship one produces. For instance, internalists will base their
work more on primary sources than externalists; presentists will be more interested
in generalization than temporalists; and so on. As we have seen, HOS tends toward
temporalist externalism, while HPS leans toward presentist internalism. There are
those toward the off poles, however. For instance, most scientists who write history,
many pre-Kuhn historians of science, and “straight” intellectual historians exem-
plify temporalist internalism.39 Meanwhile, many authors write externalist histories
with presentist punchlines (viz. “The story of . . . and how it changed the world”),
which can also be said of many popular science writers outside academe.40 There
are also any number of positions between the extremes. The axes, after all, are spec-
tral, not binary, and since they are orthogonal, there is no position on the map that
can be ruled out on a priori grounds. It remains for science historians to work out
what part of the map they want to stake out for themselves.
3.4 A Hopeful Conclusion
Given the paradigmatic differences and institutional pressures acting on the HOS
and HPS brands of science history, it is not altogether surprising that science histo-
rians have widely divergent views about what kinds of scholarship their discipline
includes. Nor is it surprising that each brand of historian is remarkably ignorant
regarding the methodology and aims of the other brand. Entrenched disciplinary
prejudices have created insularity, lack of communication, an absence of coopera-
tion, and even disdain. Meanwhile, those trying to mediate between the camps or
operate in the middle ground gain recognition from neither side. Nevertheless, there
is a feeling on both sides, I think, that something is wrong, both in their separation
from one another and in their uneasy allegiances with other disciplines.
The prejudices dividing the discipline are actually accidental impositions, born
in mainstream History and then extrinsically enforced when science history sought
39As exemplars of this type, I have in mind Jed Buchwald, William Newman, Mordechai Feingold,
Peter Dear, Nicholas Jardine, and (in more general history) Quentin Skinner and Jonathan Israel.
40Peter Galison’s How Experiments End and Stephen Johnson’s popular The Ghost Map are
examples, respectively (Galison 1987; Johnson 2006).
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institutional and intellectual relationships with the more established disciplines of
History and Philosophy. This led to the artificial segregation of the field into its HOS
and HPS brands. Yet science history is neither Philosophy nor mainstream History. It
has disciplinary demands of its own, stemming from the peculiar nature of science
itself. If we are to begin respecting those unique demands, we need to seriously
evaluate our own various approaches in our own specialized discipline. To reiterate,
my aim here is not to advocate one historiographical position over another. There
may be good reasons for emphasizing cultural factors over intellectual ones and vice
versa. My point, rather, is to encourage science historians to explicate the reasons
why they choose certain historiographical approaches over others. One should not
adhere to disciplinary biases that are not appropriate to the object of study, even if
they are the methodological dictates of a “home” discipline. Science history should
be defined as a separate discipline in its own right, something both HPS- and HOS-
like, from which morals for History and Philosophy can be drawn, but which does
not serve the sole purpose of producing such morals.
I have argued that science historians should question the historical and philo-
sophical prejudices they have used to define the divergent strands of their discipline.
Admittedly, this is a somewhat dangerous proposal, since it leaves science historians
without a clear understanding of what their discipline is, at least for the time being.
It also threatens to undermine the institutional support HOS and HPS have received
from History and Philosophy. On the other hand, the proposal is not very radical.
It only concerns the emphasis placed on certain factors and aims in the production
of scholarship, with the suggestion that the degree of emphasis be left indetermi-
nate. There are features of science history that remain uncontroversial. One would
expect universal agreement that the discipline is concerned with the description and
explanation of past science, which is itself the human enterprise of describing and
explaining natural phenomena.41
Above all, we can fall back on a basic aim of science history: the descriptions
and explanations we produce should be plausible. They should at least seem wor-
thy of refutation, if not convincing outright, to fellow practitioners. If this is our
aim, we will seek intellectual causes where they seem important and necessary and
socio-cultural factors where they seem important and necessary, without a priori
expectations favoring one kind or the other. In an adequate account, each step of
historical development will seem plausible. The skilled reader will understand how
and why things happened as they did, and the plausibility of the explanation will be
determined by past events, not by its instantiation of disciplinary norms. There will
be some latent anachronism, of course. Just as the strength of arguments depend
on their time and place, the plausibility of an account partially depends on its his-
torical context. That is to be expected, since the only way to make sense of the
past is to “fuse our horizon” with that of historical events. Just where such fusion
41The particulars of this definition might be open to dispute. For instance, depending on one’s
point of view, it might or might not include human interventions in natural phenomena through
technology and medicine. Ultimately, the scope of the discipline should be another point open for
discussion.
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should take place—close to the past or close to the present—is another matter for
negotiation. The communal evaluation of plausibility, meanwhile, implies the need
for venues and outlets open to the questioning of disciplinary bounds. The fact that
cross-disciplinary scholarship is usually refereed by a scholar in one camp or the
other, and therefore according to one set of entrenched biases, only redoubles the
present difficulties.
The looseness of the plausibility constraint forces a science historian sincerely
interested in constituting a coherent, cooperative discipline to be reflexive. Scholars
need to be continually conscious of what it is that they are doing, even as they do
it. One way to do this is to apply the methods of the study to the study itself, so
that one is always calling oneself to account to oneself. One should defend not only
the plausibility of the histories one produces, but the plausibility of the production
of those histories, and let this defense be made consciously and publicly, subject to
the observation and criticism of one’s peers. The account of the account is just as
important as the account itself. Of course, this point is nothing new. Reflexivity is
a common denominator in arguments for most scholarly methodologies. Moreover,
the best and most interesting scholarship is always the best and most interesting
precisely because it is consciously reflexive in the sense I suggest. Indeed, conscious
and explicit critical attention to the presumptions underlying responsible scholarship
is what accounts for such work’s ability to shape disciplines.42
I have tried to practice what I preach to some extent in the present essay—
producing an historio-philosophical account of the way science historians do and
perhaps should behave. In particular, I have tried to pay heed to both intellectual and
socio-cultural factors in the development of our discipline, without privileging one
over the other. Luckily, there are many other models to follow. Among recent work,
I can draw particular attention to Hasok Chang’s Inventing Temperature, which
conscientiously and explicitly combines HOS and HPS approaches into something
he calls “Complementary Science.” Chang also shows how self-critical reflection
leads to progress in science through a process of “epistemic iteration.” To my
mind, this is reflexive evidence that a reflexive approach is natural in the study of
science.43
Ultimately, science historians will need to renegotiate the boundaries of their
discipline so that their disciplinary prejudices are more organically suited to the his-
torical study of science and not so beholden to the demands of mainstream History
and Philosophy. It will require a considerable period of consensus building, and it is
impossible to predict how the discipline will be constituted beforehand. I hope the
present paper forms a starting point for negotiation, even by eliciting dissent.44
42See Laudan (1990).
43Chang (2004). This estimation is not just mine. Inventing Temperature is a work of science
history that shared the prestigious Lakatos Award for books in Philosophy of Science.
44This paper grew out of discussions with Bruno Strasser and was greatly improved by comments
from Jutta Schickore, Andrew Janiak, and the editors of this volume. All error, overstatement, and
ignorance is my own.
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